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JURISDICTION IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
CASES WHERE DEFENDANTS ARE
NON-RESIDENTS
WENDELL H. Sr[AN-NER1
T HE authority of this court is only to regulate a
manis conscience and ought not to affect the estate.
This court must agere in personam only." ' 2 Thus did
Lord Nottingham, in 1682, formulate-from what might
well have been considered a maxim of power only-a doc-
trine of limitation upon the jurisdiction of chancery.
That no inherent reason of jurisprudence compelled this
formulation of the maxim sufficiently appears from the
chancellor's general and uninterrupted use of the writ of
sequestration from the time of Bacon. Equally persua-
sive of the existence of an early in rem jurisdiction in
equity was the free use, as long ago as the reign of
Elizabeth, of the writ of assistance. Nevertheless, this
proclamation of chancery, whereby it disclaimed any
purpose of invading the jurisdiction of the common law
judges, served well the exigencies of the time; for it
allayed judicial strife and thus enabled the chancellors to
accomplish by stealth what they could never have done
by an open and avowed encroachment upon the common
law jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is probable that the
relief afforded by the peculiar principles of equity was
effectually administered by the process of contempt and
I Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern,. 75, 77; 23 Eng. Rep. 322.
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that an in rem jurisdiction would have appeared to the
early chancellors as a mere surplusage of power.
The development of international trade and the ex-
pansion, during the eighteenth century, of the old world
into the new, together with the peculiar political organi-
zation of the North American continent into separate
states, introduced an era of absentee ownership in land
quite unsuited to the exclusive in personam jurisdiction
of equity. However, the maxim that equity acts in per-
sonam, understood as a limitation of judicial action, had
found such firm lodgment in the learning of chancery
that it was not until legislative intervention, at the close
of the eighteenth century, that the distinctive principles
of equity became more broadly effective by their direct
operation upon property situated within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
Maryland, it appears, was the first of the American
jurisdictions to provide by statute (1785) that should a
party neglect or refuse to perform a decree requiring
him to make a conveyance, release, or acquittance, "such
decree shall stand, to be considered and taken in all
courts of law and equity to have the same operation and
effect as if the conveyance, release, or acquittance had
been executed conformably to such decree." Similar
statutes were enacted in New Jersey and Tennessee dur-
ing the years of 1799 and 1801 respectively. At present
all states except New Mexico, New Hampshire, and
Nevada, have statutes which, though varying in scope
and effect, exhibit the common characteristic of making
certain decrees-historically considered in personam
only-operate, under certain conditions, directly upon
the subject-matter of the controversy, thereby accom-
plishing the desired end without the co-operation of the
party. The extent to which such statutes, either directly
or by the accident of mistaken applicability, have en-
larged the authority of courts of equity and enabled
them to give an in rem effect to decrees for the specific
performance of contracts, has been a matter of judicial
inquiry in most of the American jurisdictions.
The comparatively early and general appearance of
these statutes among the several states has necessarily
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prevented a division of the authorities into an earlier
and a later group separated by a definite line of statutory
change. Indeed, all but a few of the reported cases dis-
close attempts by parties complainant to support their
claims, to the relief of specific performance against non-
resident defendants over whom the court has acquired
jurisdiction by constructive service, upon some statutory
foundation which it was contended had the effect of giv-
ing an in rem aspect to decrees for specific performance.
The courts have frequently found that such statutes did
not accomplish the supposed change, and it is mainly in
such cases that we find the jurisdiction of equity stated
in the language of the early precedents.
Perhaps the leading authority of this country, fixing
the boundaries of chancery's general jurisdiction as it
existed independently of statute, is Spurr, et al. v. Sco-
ville.8 There the defendant, an inhabitant of the state of
Connecticut, had contracted with the plaintiff to convey
title to certain real estate situated in Massachusetts.
Upon defendant's refusal to perform the contract, plain-
tiff sued out a writ of attachment in which was inserted
a bill in equity for specific performance of the contract.
The defendant's real estate in Berkshire, Massachusetts,
was attached on the writ, and service was had by deliv-
ering to defendant in Connecticut a copy of the writ and
bill. The jurisdiction of the court was questioned by a
demurrer to the bill. In sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the bill, the court said: "This is strictly a
proceeding in personam. There is but one person who is
the party defendant, and he is not a passive party, but
must be eminently active in the performance of any de-
cree which may be made against him . . ." and: "In
the particular class of cases in which courts of equity
are called upon to decree a specific performance of con-
tracts respecting lands, it seems well established, by the
elementary writers, and the decisions, both English and
American, that the party against whom the decree is
sought must be within the jurisdiction of the court."
The court experienced no difficulty in reaching its con-
clusion despite a statute,4 then effective in that jurisdic-
23 Cush. (Mass.) 578.
' Gen. St. of Mass., Ch. 100, par. 15.
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tion, the possibly applicable part of which was:
When a person, seized or possessed of real or personal
property, or an interest therein, upon a trust, express or
implied, is under the age of twenty-one years, insane,
out of the commonwealth, or not amenable to the process
of any court therein, which has equity powers, and where
in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court or of a
Probate Court it is fit that sale should be made of such
estate or of an interest therein, or that a conveyance or
transfer should be made thereof, in order to carry into
effect the object of the trust, the court may by decree
direct such sale, conveyance or transfer to be made, and
may appoint some suitable person in the place of such
trustee, to sell, convey or transfer the same in such man-
ner as it may require. If a person so seized or pos-
sessed of an estate, or entitled thereto upon a trust is
within the jurisdiction of the court her or his guardian
may be ordered to make such conveyance as the court
may deem proper.
A very liberal construction of this section might have
enabled the court to retain jurisdiction of the cause to
frame a decree of specific performance on the theory that
the defendant vendor was a trustee "out of the common-
wealth or not amenable to the process of any court
therein." As no mention of this statute is made in the
opinion it is quite possible that the court's attention was
not directed to it. In any event, its utility in broadening
the in rem jurisdiction of courts of equity in cases of
specific performance was not judicially recognized until
1875 when the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Felch
v. Hooper, et al.5 decreed specific performance of a con-
tract to convey lands situated in Massachusetts, upon
facts similar to those before the court in Spurr v. Sco-
ville. However, the plaintiff in Felch v. Hooper had en-
tered into possession of the lands to be conveyed and,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant,
had made -valuable and permanent improvements there-
on. This circumstance appears to have enabled the court
to say that the non-resident owner was a trustee and
that, accordingly, there was jurisdiction in rem under
the statute to decree specific performance and make the
1119 Mass. 52.
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decree effective by appointing a resident trustee to exe-
cute it by conveying title to the plaintiff.
In a later case, Merrill, et al. v. Beckwith,6 decided in
1895, the court held that where the relation between the
parties is simply that of contract there is, correctly
speaking, no trust created but merely a contract of sale
and purchase of which a court of equity will, under cer-
tain circumstances, decree a specific performance. But,
when the person agreeing to purchase has been allowed
by the owner to enter upon the land and make improve-
ments a trust is created in his favor. It would therefore
seem that in Massachusetts there is no jurisdiction in
rem in the specific performance cases unless special equi-
ties exist in favor of the resident plaintiff so that the non-
resident party may be deemed a trustee under the stat-
ute. This application of the statute, of course, results
from a distinctly liberal construction of its provisions.
When the conveyance sought will require the execu-
tion of personal covenants by those against whom the
suit for specific performance proceeds, the general pow-
ers of a court of equity are not aided by a statute au-
thorizing the appointment of a trustee to execute the
decree, and, therefore, service by publication on non-
resident defendants will not supply a jurisdictional basis
for such a decree. In holding that it was without juris-
diction specifically to enforce a contract for the execu-
tion of a ninety-nine year lease which was to contain
certain personal covenants of the lessors, where certain
of them were non-residents and were served by publica-
tion, the Supreme Court of Maryland said:
Decrees for specific performance are against the per-
son bound by the contract; they are in personam and not
in rem. . . Therefore, it is essential, to the effec-
tive character of the decree, that the parties, against
whom it is made, be within the jurisdiction and reach of
the court. If they be beyond its reach and coercive
power, the court is without the means of enforcing its
decree. Neither process of contempt nor injunction will
aid the court or affect the parties beyond its jurisdiction.
Being a mere personal decree, to have effect beyond the
163 Mass. 503.
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jurisdiction of the state where it is rendered, it must be
founded either upon personal service of process or upon
a voluntary appearance of the party.7
It is apparent that where courts have found such stat-
utes inapplicable and have by their decisions completely
disassociated these provisions from the traditional cri-
teria whereby a distinction is taken between actions in
rem and actions in personam, the decrees must be formu-
lated upon principles established by precedent alone.
Such was the situation in Silver Camp Mining Company
v. Dickert. A statute provided:
When the person on whom the service of a summons is
to be made resides out of the state, or has departed from
the state, or conceals himself to avoid the service of sum-
mons; or when the defendant is a foreign corporation,
having no managing or business agent, cashier, secretary
or other officer within the state, and an affidavit stating
any of these facts is filed with the clerk of the court in
which the action is brought, and such affidavit also states
that a cause of action exists against the defendant in
respect to whom the service of summons is to be made,
and that he or it is a necessary or broper party to the
action, the clerk of the court in which the action is com-
menced shall cause service of summons to be made by
publication thereof.9
Service had been obtained on the defendant, a resident
of the state of Utah, under the authority of the foregoing
section and the complainant insisted that the court had
thereby obtained jurisdiction to make a decree effective
in rem. The court, after deciding that a suit for specific
performance was a suit which, if successful, must ter-
minate in a decree operative in personam only, referred
to this section by adopting the language of the opinion in
Roller v. Holly, 0 .as follows:
Obviously this article has no application to suits in
personam. The article must then be restricted to actions
in rem; but to what class of actions, since none is men-
tioned specially in this article? We are bound to give it
some effect. We cannot treat it as wholly nugatory, and
as it is impossible to say that it contemplates a pro-
Worthington, et al. v. Lee, et al., 61 MId. 530.
'31 Mont. 488.
'Code of Civil Procedure (Mont.), sec. 637.
10 176 U. S. 398.
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cedure in one class of cases and not in another, we think
the only reasonable construction is to hold that it applies
to all cases where, under recognized principles of law,
suits may be instituted against non-resident defendants.
In Hollingsworth v. Barbour," the validity of a con-
veyance by the court's commissioner, pursuant to decree
based on service by publication, was sought to be sus-
tained under a statute authorizing such service against
non-residents in suits by persons claiming lands as lo-
cators. The pertinent provisions of the statute are:
Where any person or persons, their heirs or assigns,
claim land as locator, or by bond or other instrument in
writing, they may institute a suit in equity, having juris-
diction in such cases; and when the party, having died,
and the legal title descended to his heirs, the complainant
may proceed to obtain a decree for the land, though the
particular names of the heirs be unknown and not par-
ticularly named in the suit, although they may be resi-
dents of the commonwealth or not, but in such cases, it
shall be advertised eight weeks in one of the gazettes of
this state, requiring such heirs or representatives to
appear and make defense.
The court in construing the statute reached the con-
clusion that the jurisdiction authorized thereby was spe-
cial and limited and as the complainant was not a locator
the court was without jurisdiction to direct the convey-
ance. It then declared the rule applicable as follows:
The case under consideration is not properly a pro-
ceeding in rem; and a decree in chancery for the con-
veyance of land has never yet, within my knowledge,
been held to come within the principle of proceedings
in rem, so far as to dispense with service of process on
the party. There is no seizure nor taking into the cus-
tody of the court the land so as to operate as construc-
tive notice. Constructive notice, therefore, can only exist
in the cases coming fairly within the provisions of the
statutes authorizing the courts to make orders of publi-
cation, and providing that the publications, when made,
shall authorize the courts to decree. It has already been
shown that this case is not within the provisions of any
statute.
114 Pet. (U. S.) 466.
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Nor can a special power conferred by statute be given
effect beyond the precise scope of the enactment so as
to authorize proceedings generally against property of
non-residents by a mere publication of notice. In Bo's-
well's Lessee v. Otis,12 the bill gave the proceeding the
;form of a suit for specific performance of a contract to
convey realty. The suit, however, terminated in a money
decree in which it was also adjudged that the decree
should have the same operation and effect as a judgment
at law and be a lien on all the real estate owned by the
defendant, a non-resident, within the county. The stat-
ute gave jurisdiction over the rights of absent defend-
ants on publication of notice, "in all cases properly cog-
nizable in courts of equity, where either the title to, or
boundaries of, land may come in question, or where a
suit in chancery becomes necessary in order to obtain
the rescission of a contract for the conveyance of land,
or to compel the specific execution of such contract."
Execution issued against a parcel of land wholly un-
connected with the contract, specific performance of
which was the ostensible purpose of complainant's suit.
The Supreme Court refused to sustain the jurisdiction
of the lower court to affect land not mentioned in the
contract and in doing so stated:
A bill for the specific execution of a contract to convey
real estate is not strictly a proceeding in rem, in or-
dinary cases; but where such a procedure is authorized
by statute, on publication, without personal service of
process, it is, substantially, of that character. . .
Under this statute13 the bill of Hawkins purports to have
been filed. But without reference to the other lots sold
under the decree there is no pretense to say that the
bill had any relation to the title or boundaries of lot No.
7, or to any contract for the conveyance of the same.
And it is only in these cases that the act authorizes a
chancery proceeding against the land of non-residents
by giving public notice. It is a special and limited juris-
diction, and cannot be legally exercised, except within
the provisions of the statute.
Statutes designed to give courts of equity power to
affect directly by their decrees the title to lands or other
'29 How. (U. S.) 336.13 Chancery Act of Ohio of 1824, see. 12.
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property within the courts' jurisdiction have generally
assumed one of two forms: First, power may be granted
to the court authorizing the appointment of a trustee,
commissioner, or other officer to perform the decree by
executing and delivering a deed of conveyance on behalf
of the party whose duty to make such conveyance is
established by the decree; or, second, the statute may
provide that the transfer of title shall be accomplished
by the direct effect of the decree without the interven-
tion of the usual acts of conveyance. Under a statute
of either type, the in rem character of the decree is mani-
fest, and where provision is made for constructive ser-
vice on non-resident defendants, specific performance of
contracts capable of specific execution ought to be de-
creed as a matter of course and such seems to have been
the unanimous holding of the courts in jurisdictions hav-
ing such statutes.
In a recent decision of the Court of Appeals in New
York,14 a decree was granted for specific performance of
a contract to convey title to land situated in New York,
against the vendor, a resident of Connecticut, over whom
the court obtained jurisdiction by the service on him in
Connecticut of the summons and complaint. The statute
provided that "Where the complaint demands judgment
that the defendant be excluded from a vested or con-
tingent interest in or lien upon specific real or personal
property within the state, or that such an interest or lien
in favor of either party be enforced, regulated, defined
or limited, or otherwise affecting the title to such prop-
erty,"' 5 the summons may be served out of the state,
and also that "Where a judgment directs a party .
to convey real property, if the direction is disobeyed,
the court, by order, punishing the disobedience as a con-
tempt, may require the sheriff . . . to convey the real
property in conformity with the direction of the court. "10
The court, in speaking of the Practice Act, declared Sec-
tions 232 and 235 to be sufficiently broad to cover an
action for specific performance and, in speaking of Sec-
tion 979, said: "It has changed the nature of the action
" Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N. Y. 261.
Civ. Prac. Act, secs. 232, 235.
"Civ. Prac. Act, sec. 979.
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from an action in personam to an action substantially
in rem." The same result was reached by the Supreme
Court of Maryland in Hollander v. Central Metal and
S upply Co.,17 under a statute' s authorizing constructive
service in the following language:
If, in any suit in chancery, by bill or petition, respecting
in any manner the sale, partition, conveyance or trans-
fer of any real or personal property lying or being in
this state, or to foreclose any mortgage thereon, or to
enforce any contract or lien relating to the same, or con-
cerning any use, trust or other interest therein, where
any or all of the defendants are non-residents, the court
in which such suit is pending may order notice to be
given to such non-residents, of the substance and object
of such bill or petition, and warning them to appear by
a day therein stated.
Another section of the same article of the Code"9 au-
thorized the court, whenever the execution of a deed of
any kind is decreed to appoint a trustee to execute it.
The court distinguished this case from Worthington v.
Lee, supra, since, in the former, specific execution of the
contract would require the assumption by the defendants
of certain duties to be performed by them personally
whereas the contract before the court in the latter case
was susceptible of full performance by the transfer of
title alone. In the same category belongs the case of
Clem v. Givens,20 where the Supreme Court of Virginia
approved a decree requiring a non-resident trustee, noti-
fied by publication, specifically to perform a contract to
convey land situated in Virginia. The section of the
Code which the court held sufficient to make the pro-
ceeding one in rem provided:
A court of equity, in a suit wherein it is proper to decree
or order the execution of any deed or writing, may ap-
point a Commissioner to execute the same; and the exe-
cution thereof shall be as valid to pass, release or ex-
tinguish the right, title and interest of the party on
whose behalf it is executed as if such party had been at
the time capable in law of executing the same and had
executed it.21
, 109 Md. 131.
"Md. Code 1904, Art. XVI, sec. 117.
"Art. XVI, sec. 91.
"106 Va. 145.
nVa. Code 1904, sec. 3418.
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This section was subsequently incorporated in the Code
of West Virginia 22 and has been held to have the same
construction and effect as that given to it by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia.
23
It seems to be the Federal rule that suits against non-
resident owners for the specific performance of contracts
relating to land situated within the district of the forum,
will be entertained, where the statutory authorization is
found in the laws of a state of the district in which the
land has its site. In Single v. Scott Paper Manufactur-
ing Co., et al.,24 the complainant, a resident of the state
of New York, sought and obtained a decree for specific
performance against the defendants who were non-resi-
dents of the district and citizens of the state of Michigan.
Service on the defendants was obtained, in conformity
with the Federal practice, by the service upon the de-
fendants in Michigan of certified copies of an order en-
tered by the district court, directing that the defendants
appear and defend the suit. The court in. referring to
its jurisdiction to enforce a remedy created by a statute
of Ohio summarizes the effect of the local law thus:
If there were doubts as to whether under general equity
rules and principles administered by this court, aided
by the provisions of Section 738, the defendants could
be brought within the jurisdiction of the court without
personal service, the authority of the court to entertain
such jurisdiction and administer the relief sought, is
made more certain and effective by reason of the Ohio
statutes. Section 5024, Rev. St. Ohio, authorizes an ac-
tion to compel the specific performance of a contract for
the sale of real estate. Section 5048 provides for con-
structive service in such cases. Section 5318 provides
that, when a party against whom a judgment or a con-
veyance . . . is rendered, does not comply therewith by
the time appointed, such judgment shall have the same
operation and effect, and be as available as if the con-
veyance . . . had been executed conformably to such
judgment. Considering these statutory provisions in the
light of the principles announced in the case of Boswell's
Lessee v. Otis, above quoted, our jurisdiction in this case
seems clear.
Ch. 132, sec. 4.
" In Birch v. Covert, 83 W. Va. 752.
55 Fed. 553.
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Arndt v. Griggs25 is generally considered to have es-
tablished the constitutionality of state laws which pro-
vide for decrees operative in rem against property owned
by non-resident defendants who have been notified by
publication, or otherwise, constructively subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of which the property to be affected has its situs.
The Nebraska Statute held constitutional in that case,
provided generally for service by publication against
non-resident defendants in actions which "relate to, or
the subject of which, is real or personal property in this
state, where any defendant has or claims a lien or in-
terest, actual or contingent, therein, or the relief de-
manded consists wholly or partially in excluding him
from any interest therein, and such defendant is a non-
resident of the state or a foreign corporation." It is
arguable that this language does not embrace suits for
specific performance, although a statute of substantially
the same wording was held in Garfein v. McInnis to have
that effect; but the principle laid down in this case is
broad enough to sustain the jurisdiction in the specific
performance cases where the local statute, whether- of
general or specific provisions, authorizes constructive
service on non-resident defendants.
In a few jurisdictions the courts seem to have estab-
lished an in rem jurisdiction over suits for specific per-
formance without the aid of any statute. Rourke v.
McLaughlin26 was an action by a non-resident vendor to
recover a judgment for the first instalment on a contract
to convey land situated in the state of California. The
resident purchaser interposed the defense that, should
judgment be entered for the sum demanded and should
he subsequently perform his undertaking by paying the
whole of the agreed purchase price, he would be unable
specifically to enforce the contract against the vendor.
The court met this contention in saying that .
The fact that the plainiff may be beyond the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state when the defendant may be-
come entitled to a deed is wholly immaterial. His ab-
sence will neither prevent his making a deed voluntarily,
134 U. S. 316.
38 Cal. 196.
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nor prevent the courts of this state from compelling a
deed to be given by the plaintiff himself, or by a com-
missioner appointed to act in his place. The rule seems
to be that specific performance will be decreed whenever
the parties or the subject matter or so much thereof as
is sufficient to enable the court to enforce its decree, is
within the jurisdiction of the court.
But little attempt is made by the court to support its
conclusion by reference to precedents, and it has been
suggested that the result might have been different had
not a California statute provided for the appointment of
a commission to transfer title. 27 As Professor Walsh
8
has pointed out, the Supreme Court of Nevada has taken
the same advanced position in Robinson v. Kind29 with-
out the aid of any statute. It was there said that actions
to set aside fraudulent conveyances of real estate belong
to the class of actions "for the recovery of real property,
or of any estate or interest therein or of the determina-
tion in any form of such right or interest" and may be
prosecuted against non-residents by publication. There
can be little question as to the desirable character of the
results consequent upon these decisions, but it may well
be doubted whether the courts of these jurisdictions
should have so definitely invaded the province of the
legislature in bringing their law into harmony with the
almost universal practice of the American jurisdictions.
In conclusion, it should be remembered that the en-
largement of in rem jurisdiction of equity has by no
means terminated, or even reduced, the traditional power
of chancery to act in personam, and that now as always
courts of equity may proceed against the person of a
contumacious defendant and thereby compel him per-
sonally to perform the act required of him by the decree.
Manifestly, in those cases, where specific performance of
contracts, affecting property without the jurisdiction of
the court is sought, the decree must have an in personam
operation exclusively.
"Boke, Cases on Equity, p. 75.
Walsh, Equity, pp. 51, 52.
n 23 Nev. 330.
